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A B S T R A C T
This paper addresses the question of how firms accomplish the strategic task of adapting their entire set of IORs
(interorganizational relationships) to changing environmental conditions. To study this, we move beyond the
focus on collaboration with individual partners (the dyadic perspective) that has been the dominant emphasis in
the literature until now. Instead, we view the firms’ portfolios through the lens of the different modes of IOR
engaged in (licensing agreements, non-equity alliances, venture capital investments, minority investments, joint
ventures, and mergers & and acquisitions). We study the role of environmental change within the high-tech
setting of the bio-pharmaceutical industry and distinguish between industry technological change and firm-
specific technological change. In doing so, we rely on prospect theory to theorize how firms’ perceptions of
environmental change in terms of a looming loss or a potential gain affect their risk-bearing, how this leads them
to adjust their IOR portfolio diversity, and how these adjustments get implemented at the mode level. Whereas
most of our hypotheses were confirmed by the study, a key unexpected finding was that firms respond to both
types of technological change through stronger forms of adaptation than theoretically anticipated. Firms adapt
to industry technological change through an increase in the diversity of their portfolio of IORs and by churning it
up, which leads to a loosening of control at the individual mode level but greater adaptivity at the portfolio level.
When facing firm-specific change instead, they adapt by reducing portfolio diversity, while cutting back on
collaboration across five out of the six modes. Our findings both contribute to the literature on organizational
adaptation, interfirm collaboration, and IOR portfolios and provide a greater behavioral understanding of net-
work change.
1. Introduction
For firms in technology-intensive industries, external collaboration
has become a pervasive phenomenon, since it generally brings positive
effects for their overall performance and innovation performance in
particular. Collaboration offers a number of substantive benefits formed
by the possibilities for mutual knowledge sharing, combining com-
plementary skills, scale economies in research, and sharing costs and
risks (Ahuja, 2000a; Gilsing et al., 2008; Hagedoorn, 1993; Phelps,
2010; Sabidussi et al., 2014). This resonates with the dominant, static
view in the large volume of literature on interorganizational relation-
ships (IORs) and interfirm collaboration, which has predominantly
emphasized the stable value derived from these activities and focused
on performance outcomes (Tasselli et al., 2015; Wassmer, 2010).
More recently, however, an emerging view in the literature argues
that to ensure their IORs remain beneficial, firms need to adapt and
renew their portfolio of such relationships on an ongoing basis (Ahuja
et al., 2012; Powell et al., 2005). This is also in line with some recent
success stories on innovation collaboration, such as Procter & Gamble’s
connect and develop program, IBM’s emerging business areas, and
LEGO’s open innovation strategy—examples of three different compa-
nies that adapted their IOR portfolio and thus enhanced their ability to
create new innovations and secure future competitiveness (Foss et al.,
2012). In line with this, recent studies have called for an investigation
of the antecedents of firms’ IOR portfolios and the development of a
dynamic perspective (Ahuja et al., 2012; Kantola et al., 2017; Phelps
et al., 2012; Tatarinowitz et al., 2016).
In technology-intensive environments, especially, ongoing techno-
logical change can quickly render existing knowledge and skills ob-
solete, implying that the IORs in place lose their value and requiring
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that a firm adapt and renew its IOR portfolio (Powell et al., 2005). This
ties into a broader debate in the literature on the need for ongoing
organizational adaptation, the single most important factor for long-
term survival (Haveman, 2003; Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985; Meyer
et al., 1990; O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008; Siggelkow and Levinthal,
2003). The purpose of organizational adaptation is to maintain or im-
prove fit with changing environmental conditions in the aim of en-
hancing performance and ensuring future survival (Hrebiniak and
Joyce, 1985; Meyer et al., 1990).
In the growing literature on this topic, the main emphasis has been
on adjustments to a firm’s internal organizational attributes, such as
changes to: managerial roles (Stan and Puranam, 2017), individual
learning (Aggarwal et al., 2017), service offerings (Ruef, 1997), strategy
and structure (Jennings and Seaman, 1994), internal routines (Yi et al.,
2016), multi-level organizational dynamics (Dattee and Barlow, 2017),
or identity (Dutton and Dukerich, 1991). Given the prevalence of IORs
for modern firms these days, the question arises as to what extent firms
are also adapting core external organizational attributes to changing
environmental conditions. Although there is an emerging under-
standing of the adaptation at the individual partnership level (e.g.,
Gulati, 1995), our current understanding of how firms accomplish the
major strategic task of adapting their external organization of IORs as a
whole remains in its infancy.
We will study the role of environmental change within the context
of a high-technology setting, that of the bio-pharmaceutical industry,
distinguishing between industry technological change (defined as
technological turbulence at the industry level) and firm-specific tech-
nological change (defined as technological turbulence at the firm level).
The distinction is based on similar distinctions made with regard to
uncertainty in general, specifically between an entire industry’s un-
certainty/market level uncertainty and a firm’s specific uncertainty
(e.g., Beckman, Haunschild, & Philips, 2004; Cuypers and Martin, 2010;
Li, 2008). In one earlier study, Beckman et al. (2004) considered how
firms respond to uncontrollable market uncertainty and found that they
adapted by reinforcing their standing network through the formation of
additional alliances with existing partners.
Uncontrollability of environmental uncertainty is generally linked
to a threat-rigidity response, which leads us to expect that firms would
indeed strengthen their existing IORs since these are likely to be of
assistance in times of uncertainty (e.g., Granovetter, 1982; Krackhardt
(1992); Williamson, 1981). Another key form of environmental change
besides uncontrollable external events is that imposed by technological
change, something that may be more within the bounds of discretion
for individual firms, yet carries risks of loss or potential gain
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Greve, 1998; Ocasio, 1995; Tushman and
Anderson, 1986). This raises the question of how firms adjust their
entire set of IORs in response to such technological change. How dif-
ferently do firms respond and do they do it by exerting more control or
becoming more adaptive? The purpose of this study is to address this
important issue by shedding more light on the extent to which firms
accomplish this by adjusting their external organization made up of
IORs.
This focus on how firms adjust their external organization implies
that we need to move beyond the examination of the collaboration with
individual partners (dyadic perspective) that has dominated the lit-
erature until now. Instead, the lens that we will apply is formed by a
company’s IOR portfolio. Firms use different modes of IORs—such as
licensing agreements, non-equity alliances, corporate venture capital
investments (CVCs), minority investments, joint ventures (JVs), and
mergers and acquisitions (M&As)—to collaborate with others. Because
of differences between these modes and their advantages and dis-
advantages, firms employ a combination of them simultaneously, pro-
ducing a varied portfolio (Carayannopoulos and Auster, 2010; Kantola
et al., 2017; Keil et al., 2008).
We will study firms’ adaptations to their portfolio of IORs at two
different levels of analysis. First, we will focus on the portfolio level by
considering the degree of diversity. We define portfolio diversity as the
diversity of IOR modes that a firm employs at a certain point in time,
and we will investigate whether firms adapt to environmental change
by either increasing or decreasing their portfolio diversity.1 Second, we
will consider the individual mode level by studying how firms imple-
ment these adaptations to their IOR portfolio diversity by adjusting the
number of newly initiated IORs or varying the portfolio’s composition
in terms of type (e.g., more licensing agreements at the expense of JVs
or vice versa).
For the purposes of our analysis, traditional transaction costs eco-
nomics (TCE) theory would appear less well equipped for under-
standing this question of how firms adjust their portfolio of IORs for
two reasons. First, TCE focuses on maximizing efficiency in an in-
dividual transaction or partnership, rather than on maximizing the joint
efficiency of a set of transactions or partnerships. This implies that TCE
carries less relevance when analyzing the adaptation of a combina-
tion—a portfolio—of multiple IOR modes, which is the focus of this
study. The second reason has to do with our focus on environmental
change. To the extent that environmental change, as formed by tech-
nological change, increases, the future becomes more difficult to pre-
dict. As we will further outline below, TCE has proven less equipped to
understanding governance choices under environmental conditions of
unpredictability. TCE’s core prediction is that increasing uncertainty
leads to more hierarchical and control-oriented forms of collaboration.
However, this runs counter to an emerging stream in the literature that
argues, and demonstrates, that under increasing uncertainty due to
change (technological and otherwise), firms resort to more adaptive
forms of organizing (Folta, 1998; Santoro and McGill, 2005; Li and Li,
2010).
Moreover, the impact of environmental change is not necessarily
unequivocal for firms, and as such managers must interpret its im-
plications more than with other forms of change. This suggests the need
for a more behavioral perspective that helps us analyze how firms adapt
their external organization based on their understanding of different
types of environmental change. The behavioral perspective that we will
rely on in this study is that of prospect theory. As we argue below,
prospect theory is useful in this context because it explains how ex-
ecutives’ perceptions of environmental change in terms of a looming
loss or a potential gain affect their risk-bearing (Anderson and Nichols,
2007; Bromiley, 2010; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Pérez-Nordtvedt
et al., 2014; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and how this then af-
fects their decisions and actions on adjusting their external organization
of IORs.
Below, we first outline our theory and hypotheses. This is followed
by a description of a new dataset—comprising over 8400 IORs be-
longing to the 282 largest firms in the pharmaceutical biotechnology
industry over a period from 1990 until 2006—that we developed to
capture the various types of technological change and investigate our
hypotheses. We end the paper with a number of conclusions, as well as
a broader discussion of how our study informs the wider literature.
2. Conceptual background and hypotheses
2.1. Interorganizational relationships
The benefits of IORs have been well documented in the literature
(e.g., Phelps et al., 2012; Kantola et al., 2017). As argued and shown,
such relationships offer opportunities for knowledge recombination and
scale economies, but also for spreading risks and hedging bets (e.g.,
1 Note that the focus of this paper is on the diversity of the IOR modes used by
the focal firm. This diversity is the result of the variety of modes a firm uses and
hence does not refer to another concept called partner diversity (which focuses
on different partner types, such as buyers, suppliers, research institutes, etc.; see
e.g., De Leeuw et al., 2014).
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Ahuja, 2000a; Kogut, 1991). To accomplish these objectives, firms have
come to rely on different modes of IORs, such as licensing agreements,
non-equity alliances, CVC investments, minority investments, JVs, and
M&As.
A firm’s IOR portfolio will include all of these major modes.
Although each mode has specific advantages and characteristics,
Hagedoorn (1993) has shown that they differ in their degree of inter-
dependence between the partnering firms. As such, each individual
relationship may differ in terms of the level of flexibility and degree of
control (Barringer and Harrison, 2000; Keil et al., 2008; Van de Vrande
et al., 2009), which allows us to draw a general distinction between two
categories of modes for external collaboration. Fig. 1, summarizes the
IOR modes in relation to their level of interdependence, control, and
flexibility.
On the one hand, there are more arm’s-length, market-like forms of
IORs that offer flexibility. Typically, these are formed through licensing
agreements, non-equity alliances, or corporate venturing activities. On
the other hand, there are more integrated IOR modes representing
hierarchical forms of collaboration that offer more control. Typically,
those modes are formed through minority investments, JVs, and M&As.
Because of differences between these modes of IORs and their ad-
vantages and disadvantages, firms employ a combination of them si-
multaneously (Carayannopoulos and Auster, 2010; Keil et al., 2008)
and it has been argued that such diversity contributes to a firm’s in-
novation success (Duysters and Lokshin, 2011; Goerzen and Beamish,
2005; Hashai et al., 2015; Jiang et al., 2010; Lee et al., 2017; Sabidussi
et al., 2014).
Despite the fact that firms rely on a combination of IOR modes, the
dominant emphasis in the literature has been on governance choices for
one particular form or another; for example, the conditions under
which equity-based collaboration might be preferred over more arm’s-
length relations with a prospective partner (e.g., Santoro and McGill,
2005). The key theoretical perspective in such studies is that of trans-
action cost economics (TCE), in which the primary focus is on choosing
a governance form that reduces uncertainty and economizes on trans-
action costs (e.g., frequency of exchange, degree of asset specificity, and
behavioral uncertainty of a partner). The general principle through TCE
is that when transaction costs increase, more integrated forms are
preferable for controlling the hazards of collaboration (Williamson,
1981).
Within the context of technological collaboration, transaction costs
also come from the uncertainty caused by technological complexity.
Technological complexity can arise, among other things, from a large
distance between partners in their respective fields of technological
specialization or when collaboration takes place in complex technolo-
gical domains. The ensuing increase in transaction costs makes equity
forms preferable to non-equity ones for bridging any large technolo-
gical distance between partners (Colombo, 2003) or acquisitions pre-
ferable to alliances for collaborating in complex technological domains
(Carayannopoulos and Auster, 2010). In line with this, it has also been
argued that equity forms are more suitable for highly complex colla-
borations, such as ones with a broad product, technology, or activity
scope or with a strong technology focus (Folta, 1998; Gulati, 1995;
Gulati and Singh, 1998; Hagedoorn, 1993), or in cases where com-
plementary assets for commercializing new innovations are specialized
rather than generic (Teece, 1986).
However, apart from being related to technological complexity,
uncertainty can also follow from environmental change. Environmental
change can vary from static to dynamic and refers to the extent to
which the external environment remains basically the same or is in a
process of discontinuous or continuous change (Dess and Beard, 1984;
Duncan, 1972). To the extent that an environment is in a state of flux, it
becomes increasingly difficult to predict the future. This makes en-
vironmental change, or unpredictability, a generally stronger source of
environmental uncertainty than environmental complexity (Duncan,
1972).2 Whereas environmental complexity such as technological
complexity can be computed or reasonably estimated, the amount of
uncertainty or unpredictability due to environmental change is difficult
to calculate or compute ex ante.3
As a consequence, executives managing IORs will generally be less
able to come to a reasonably accurate estimation of environmental
change. Instead, they need to rely on an interpretation of the change
and try to establish what it means. This suggests that TCE is less useful
for understanding governance choices under changing conditions and
implies a need for relying instead on a more behavioral perspective that
can provide an understanding of how firms adapt their external orga-
nization based on their interpretation of different types of environ-
mental change. The behavioral perspective that we will rely on in this
study is formed by prospect theory. As we will argue below, prospect
theory is useful in this context for explaining how executives’ percep-
tions of environmental changes in terms of a looming loss or potential
gain affect their risk-bearing (Anderson and Nichols, 2007; Bromiley,
2010; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Pérez-Nordtvedt et al., 2014;
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998) and how this affects their decisions
and actions on adjusting their IOR portfolio.
2.2. Types of technological change: industry vs. firm-specific
Technological change can be a particularly disruptive force,
Fig. 1. IOR modes and their levels of interdependence, control, and flexibility.
2 The literature on unravelling environmental uncertainty generally makes a
distinction between two dimensions of environmental complexity (Dess and
Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972): 1) the simple–complex dimension takes the
number of factors, and their interdependency, into account in decision making;
2) the static–dynamic dimension looks at the degree to which these factors in
the environment remain the same over time or are in a continual state of
change. The static–dynamic dimension of the environment is generally a
stronger contributor to uncertainty in decision making than the simple–com-
plex dimension (Dess and Beard, 1984; Duncan, 1972).
3 This stands in contrast to TCE, where the implicit idea is that the degree of
uncertainty due to complexity can generally be calculated as both frequency of
exchange and asset specificity, which can be quite accurately computed,
whereas the behavioral uncertainty of one specific partner can generally also be
estimated reasonably well, for example based on the structural embeddedness
effects in networks (Gulati and Garguilo, 1999). Hence, the general idea is that
based on this information, a rational governance choice can be made
(Williamson, 1981).
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especially in technology-intensive industries. In this context, it is de-
fined as the change in a focal firm’s technological environment (Song
et al., 2005), whereby we also make a distinction between two types of
technological change: industry and firm-specific. Industry technological
change refers to changes in technology at the industry level and in-
dicates a degree of change across a range of technology classes for a
group of firms in an industry. By contrast, firm-specific technological
change refers to a firm’s degree of change in its development of new
technologies relative to industry-level change. This implies that the
higher the degree of firm-specific change a company is experiencing,
the more it will change its technologies relative to the rest of the in-
dustry.
Here, our study builds upon the stream of literature that investigates
firms’ IOR choices as a response to change and the uncertainty related
to change. Cuypers and Martin (2010), for example, found that exo-
genous uncertainty leads to a smaller share of ownership in foreign JVs,
while endogenous uncertainty does not. Beckman et al. (2004) found
that market uncertainty leads to a reinforcing of the alliance and JV
networks, while firm-specific uncertainty leads to a broadening of the
network. Li (2008) found that market uncertainty results in a delay in
venture capital staging investments, whereas project-specific un-
certainty results in greater investment. While investigating licensing,
minority equity investments, and JVs, Santoro and McGill (2005) found
that partner and task uncertainty are positively related to more hier-
archical IOR modes, while technological uncertainty is negatively re-
lated. Li and Li (2010) found that market uncertainty is positively re-
lated to the use of flexible ownership strategies in minority/majority
JVs. Also, Folta (1998) found that technological uncertainty is posi-
tively related to equity-based collaborations versus acquisitions.
Our study is both similar and different from this prior work in the
following ways. It is in line with these earlier studies in that it shares
the general idea that firms respond differently to different types of
uncertainty. In that regard, we complement prior work by specifically
considering a high-technology context, in which it also happens to be
useful to distinguish between industry technological change and firm-
specific technological change (something that has not been considered
in earlier studies). At the same time, our study differs from earlier
studies in the broader perspective that it adopts, and it therefore makes
a major contribution to this literature. What these prior studies have in
common in studying IOR, is their focus on tactical choices, that is, which
governance form to choose in collaborating with a prospective partner.
This resonates nicely with the well-studied question in TCE of how to
economize on transaction costs in terms of mitigating the hazards of a
specific partnership and whether to choose, for example, a more equity-
based or a more non-equity-based form of collaboration.
In this study, we go beyond this dominant perspective in the lit-
erature and focus instead on the more strategic decision of how firms
adapt their entire portfolio of IORs in response to environmental change.
The focus of our study, then, is not on the optimal governance choice
for an individual partnership, but rather the corporate-level strategies
aimed at accomplishing adaptation to changing environmental condi-
tions. That is why we study the entire range of IOR modes and the
diversity at the portfolio level, rather than zeroing in on the choice
between only two (or three) modes that has formed the dominant focus
until now. As also argued above, our focus on the adaptation of a
combination of multiple forms of IORs makes TCE less relevant, given
its focus on maximizing efficiency in an individual transaction or
partnership rather than on maximizing the joint efficiency of a set of
transactions or partnerships.
Because technological change is often ambiguous, the way a firm’s
executives interpret it plays a considerable role in how that firm re-
sponds and thus affects future organizational adaptation (Eggers and
Kaplan, 2009). Executives tend to categorize environmental change in
terms of opportunities or threats, and these categorizations influence
how firms respond to environmental change through different forms of
organizational adaptation (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). The framing of
technological change in terms of a threat or an opportunity ties into an
emerging stream of literature that examines industry antecedents of
risk-taking in organizational actions (e.g., Abrahamson and Rosenkopf,
1993; Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Mone et al., 1998; Pérez-Nordtvedt
et al., 2014). The higher the degree of industry technological change,
the higher the degree of unpredictability in new technological devel-
opments and the more it may pose a threat to a firm’s existing tech-
nology position, with attendant losses in future revenues and profit
streams. Hence, a firm’s executives may perceive industry technology
change as carrying a risk of a looming loss for their firm’s position. In
contrast, firm-specific technological change indicates the extent in
which a firm is changing its technologies relative to the rest of the in-
dustry. To the extent that it changes its technologies relatively more
than the industry as a whole, it pursues a more entrepreneurial strategy,
with the potential of creating novel opportunities for commercializa-
tion, yielding likely gains in the future (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).
When environmental change is perceived by executives or decision
makers in terms of a looming loss or potential gain, earlier studies have
relied on prospect theory (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Osiyevskyy and Dewald, 2015; Wiseman and Gomez-
Mejia, 1998).4 According to prospect theory, people who anticipate a
looming loss become more risk-bearing. As a consequence, they will
resort to more externally oriented actions to influence the environment
in order to avoid that mounting loss. Meanwhile, people who perceive
an opportunity, with its associated potential gain, tend to become more
risk-averse, since they have more to lose than they have to gain
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
Following this logic, executives who anticipate a likely loss will resort
to more boundary-spanning, externally oriented actions aimed at in-
fluencing the environment, while executives who perceive a potential
gain bear fewer risks and will resort to fewer boundary-spanning, more
internally oriented actions aimed at exploiting or appropriating po-
tential gains. So, executives will take different organizational actions
depending on their assessment of whether a technological change is
seen as giving rise to a looming loss or a potential gain (Chattopadhyay
et al., 2001; Ocasio, 1995; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).
Following the distinction between industry technological change
and firm-specific technological change, we will consider how each type
of response materializes into adaptations in both the diversity of a
firm’s IOR portfolio and its corresponding implementation at the level
of individual IOR governance modes. Below, we explain how firms
respond to industry technological change through an increase in IOR
portfolio diversity (Hypothesis 1) and its corresponding implementa-
tion at the individual mode level (Hypothesis 2). In a similar vein, we
discuss how firms respond to firm-specific change through a decrease in
IOR portfolio diversity (Hypothesis 3) and the implementation of that at
the individual mode level (Hypothesis 4). Whereas these four hy-
potheses specify the type of adaptation in response to either form of
technological change, they do not address the amount of adaptation to
either form. To address this, we also consider the extent to which the
degree of adaptation differs when firms respond to either type of
change, which leads to our final hypothesis (Hypothesis 5).
4 In this paper, we prefer to use prospect theory versus threat-rigidity theory.
Prospect theory is focused on the loss or gain of tangible resources, rather than
the decrease or increase of control over external events (Chattopadhyay et al.,
2001; Greve, 1998; Ocasio, 1995). Our focus on changes in technology, that is,
industry technological change, pertains to the more tangible resources that
technology generally represents, such as knowledge stored in documents, ar-
tefacts, and practical applications. This stands in contrast to changes in, for
example, government regulation, which are very difficult for individual firms to
control. In situations of uncertainty caused by difficult-to-identify threats with
high uncontrollability, threat-rigidity is generally considered to be more ap-
propriate (Ocasio, 1995; Staw et al., 1981).
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2.3. Industry technological change: increase in IOR portfolio diversity and
implementation at the IOR mode level
Industry technological change refers to change at the industry level
and indicates the degree of change across a range of technology classes
for a group of firms in an industry. In their seminal study, Tushman and
Anderson (1986) distinguished between competence-enhancing and
competence-destroying technological change. They demonstrated that
whereas competence-destroying change obviously has stronger effects
on competitive conditions than competence-enhancing change, both
types present firms with a stark choice: adapt or face decline. “Both
types of technological discontinuities, whether competence-destroying
or competence-enhancing, appear to afford a rare opportunity for
competitive advantage for firms willing to risk early adoption … those
firms that recognize and seize opportunities presented by major ad-
vances gain first-mover advantages. Those firms that do not adopt the
innovation early … risk failing” (Tushman and Anderson, 1986: 461).
The implication is that either type of technological discontinuity only
offers a potential gain for the (very) few firms that quickly become first
movers. This means that, on average, the vast majority of firms will by
definition not be first movers. Consequently, for them, environmental
unpredictability is considerably heightened, since either type of tech-
nological discontinuity carries a risk of future loss to their existing
technology position, with attendant consequences for future revenues
and profit streams. So, unless a firm is a first mover, technological
change and its associated discontinuities carry, on average, a serious
risk of failure (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). Firm executives may
therefore perceive industry technology change as carrying a risk of
looming loss for their firm.
Some examples of such technological discontinuities include the
transition from vinyl records to CDs in music, gasoline engines to hy-
brid engines in the automotive industry, and the traditional rotary-kiln
process to the Edison cement kiln that allowed for the production of
much greater volumes of cement for incumbent cement makers
(Anderson and Tushman, 1990). This implies that industry technolo-
gical change is likely to lead to a firm losing its current position if it
does not act on it by adapting its strategy and organization, and thus its
IOR portfolio. Consistent with prospect theory, this looming loss
therefore makes firms become more risk-bearing. As a consequence,
they will engage in more boundary-spanning behavior in the form of an
increase in external activities, such as IORs, to venture more into the
environment as a means of searching for information on new technol-
ogies and hedging their bets on future potential, all in an attempt to
reduce the risk of a mounting loss. In line with this, it has been shown
that with increasing environmental change, firms resort to more
adaptive and flexible forms of organizing (e.g., Colombo, 2003; Folta,
1998; Santoro and McGill, 2005).
This implies that firms will engage in more flexible and adaptive
IOR modes with lower levels of interdependence, such as licensing
agreements, non-equity alliances, and CVC investments. These forms of
IORs are considered to be highly flexible and reversible, and therefore
less risky, making them more generally effective under the conditions of
unpredictability that come with industry technological change. While
these more flexible modes do offer less control over the respective
partners at the level of the individual relationship, on a portfolio level,
their addition offers more control by providing opportunities for keeping
future options open and thus making firms more adaptive to changing
environmental conditions.
However, a reduction in the number of more hierarchical IOR
modes cannot generally be accomplished overnight, so that the increase
in flexible modes will be stronger than the corresponding decrease in
the more integrated forms. As a consequence, we expect that the di-
versity of a firm’s IOR portfolio increases in response to industry
technological change. In a similar vein, at the IOR mode level, we ex-
pect that firms will initiate more adaptive and flexible linkages to ad-
dress any potential looming loss that comes with industry technological
change, leading primarily to more licensing agreements, followed by
non-equity alliances (e.g., research contracts) and corporate venturing
activities. Following this logic, they will initiate fewer control-oriented,
hierarchical forms of collaboration, with the sharpest decrease being in
M&As, followed by JVs and minority investments. Therefore, our first
and second hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 1. The degree of industry technological change is positively
related to the diversity of modes used in the focal firms’ IOR portfolio.
Hypothesis 2. The degree of industry technological change is positively
related to the number of new IORs with lower levels of interdependence, such
as licensing, non-equity alliances, and CVC investments, and negatively
related to the number of new IORs with higher levels of interdependence,
such as minority investments, JVs, and M&As.5
2.4. Firm-specific technological change: decrease in IOR portfolio diversity
and its implementation at the IOR mode level
Firm-specific technological change indicates the extent in which a
firm changes its technologies relative to the rest of the industry. To the
extent that a firm changes its technologies more than the industry, it is
actively engaging in an entrepreneurial strategy and signaling that it is
an early adopter of new products and processes, taking up the learning
curve ahead of others (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). It is thereby also
able to create more novel opportunities and pursue their early com-
mercialization, yielding likely gains in the future.
Here, prospect theory suggests that likely gains are related to more
control-directed actions since firms have more to lose than they do to
gain (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Osiyevskyy and Dewald, 2015; Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia, 1998). As a
consequence, executives perceiving a potential gain in a firm’s position
will resort to fewer boundary-spanning and more control-oriented ac-
tions aimed at exploiting and appropriating the potential gain.
Within the context of IORs, more control-oriented actions imply that
firms will rely less on market-like forms of IORs and increase their re-
liance on more control-oriented, hierarchical forms, such as minority
equity investments, JVs, and M&As. These IOR modes are generally
more effective in addressing appropriation concerns. In cases where
collaboration carries a technology component, especially, concerns of
appropriability become more acute (Gulati & Sytch, 1998). In order to
mitigate appropriation concerns, the more hierarchical modes of IORs
enable greater control, as they offer room for monitoring inputs and
free-ridership on the part of a partner, along with dispute resolution
procedures in case of misbehavior. Together, M&As, JVs, and, to a
lesser extent, minority equity collaboration offer these features in order
to govern collaboration based on considerable hierarchical controls
(Gulati & Sytch, 1998).
Hence, to appropriate returns from expected gains, a firm will shift
its focus away from externally oriented actions aimed at influencing the
environment and resort to fewer boundary-spanning and more control-
oriented actions. This altered focus towards more control over its col-
laborations will conflict with high levels of external diversity in its IOR
portfolio, which generally consumes a great deal of scarce executive
time and attention. Hence, as a response to firm-specific technological
5 To appreciate the relationship between Hypotheses 1 and 2, bear in mind
that overall portfolio diversity can still increase when the increase in IORs with
lower levels of interdependence is larger than the decrease in IORs with higher
levels of interdependence. In practice, a firm could, for instance, have two non-
equity alliances and two JVs, and when industry technological change in-
creases, it might initiate one new non-equity alliance, two extra licensing
agreements, and no new JVs (or even terminate a JV). Overall, this results in an
increase in diversity at the portfolio level (H1), an increase of IORs with lower
levels of interdependence (first part of H2), and a decrease of IORs with higher
levels of interdependence (second part of H2).
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change, firms will decrease their IOR portfolio diversity to economize
on time and attention and allocate those resources to monitoring the
more hierarchical forms of collaboration.
This form of adaptation, through a decrease in the IOR portfolio
diversity, is further reinforced by the way potential partners are likely
to act. A greater degree of firm-specific change implies more un-
certainty for potential partners, since the focal firm is taking a different
trajectory than the rest of the industry. Following TCE logic here, for a
potential partner, this means that it will be faced with two types of
risks. The first risk is relational and implies that, to the extent that firm-
specific change increases, it will need to adjust contracts, possibly even
on an ongoing basis, in order to keep pace with a focal firm’s changing
trajectories. The second risk is economic and entails a hold-up risk for
potential partners, implying that their specific investments to collabo-
rate with the focal firm may not be recoupable and will lose their value
as the rest of the industry moves along a different trajectory. So, the
more a focal firm heads into a different direction than the rest of the
industry, the more difficult it becomes for potential partners to govern
the collaboration and assess the value of that focal firm’s re-
sources—and the greater the uncertainty of collaboration and its asso-
ciated transaction costs with the focal firm becomes. As a consequence,
with rising transaction costs, a focal firm will come to rely on more
integrated modes of collaboration.
In sum, whereas for industry technological change, firms want to
keep their options open and hence prefer greater IOR diversity, with
firm-specific technological change, firms want to instead exploit and
appropriate it and therefore need less diversity. Following prospect
theory, this leads to a move away from boundary-spanning activities to
more control-oriented modes of collaboration. This is also in line with
TCE logic, which argues that with increasing firm-specific uncertainty,
potential partners face increasing transaction costs that will lead to
more integrated modes of collaboration. This results in the initiation of
more control-oriented modes of IORs with higher levels of inter-
dependence, such as minority equity investments, JVs, and M&As, at
the expense of modes with lower levels of interdependence, formed by
licensing agreements, non-equity alliances (e.g., research agreements),
and corporate venturing. Therefore, we expect a decrease in the in-
itiation of new IORs with lower levels of interdependence and an in-
crease in more control-oriented, hierarchical forms of collaboration.
Hence, our third and fourth hypotheses are:
Hypothesis 3. The degree of firm-specific technological change is negatively
related to the diversity of the IOR modes used in the focal firms’ IOR
portfolios.
Hypothesis 4. The degree of firm-specific technological change is negatively
related to the focal firms’ number of new IORs with lower levels of
interdependence, such as licensing agreements, non-equity alliances, and
CVC investments, and positively related to the number of new IORs with
higher levels of interdependence, such as minority investments, JVs, and M&
As.
2.5. Strength of change: industry technological change vs. firm-level change
As argued above, firms’ executives tend to categorize environmental
change in terms of a looming loss or potential gain, and these cate-
gorizations influence how firms respond to environmental change
through different forms of organizational adaptation (Chattopadyay
et al., 2001). Here, a central idea in prospect theory is that people
generally tend to weigh losses more heavily than gains (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). This resonates with studies examining investments
in innovation, which are generally considered risky, and the fact that
firms have a strong inclination to imitate others’ innovations. In line
with the idea of loss aversion, firms will give greater weight to a
looming loss of their existing position that puts them at a competitive
disadvantage than to an increase of similar magnitude in their position
and strengthening of their competitive advantage. This makes them
eager to copy others’ innovations to avoid incurring losses
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993).
As argued above, we associate industry technological change with a
looming loss, whereas we associate firm-specific change with potential
gain. The implication that follows is that, when comparing the strength
of firms’ adaptive response to either type of change, we expect a firm’s
response to industry technological change to be stronger than to firm-
specific technological change. More specifically, we expect that the
effect of an increase in its IOR portfolio diversity (in response to in-
dustry technological change) compared to a decrease in its IOR port-
folio diversity (in response to firm-specific technological change) will
be substantively stronger. In a similar vein, we expect the predicted
effects of changes in the individual modes of IOR to be stronger for
industry technological change relative to firm-specific change.
Therefore, our final hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 5a. The effect size of industry technological change on a firm’s
adaptation of its IOR portfolio diversity will be stronger than the effect size of
firm-specific technological change.
Hypothesis 5b. The effect size of changes in its individual IOR modes
(increase or decrease) will be stronger for industry technological change
compared to firm-specific change.
3. Data and methods
3.1. Context and data
The hypotheses were tested on a unique, newly developed, panel
database created using the annual rankings of the 100 largest (by
number of employees) U.S. public pharmaceutical biotechnology firms.
If a firm appeared at least once in the top 100 largest firms, it was
included as a focal firm. This resulted in a list of 282 focal firms. These
firms were selected for the years 1990–2010 from the Compustat North
America database from the following five pharmaceutical bio-
technology SIC codes: 2833 (medicinal chemicals and botanical pro-
ducts), 2834 (pharmaceutical preparations), 2835 (in vitro and in vivo
diagnostic substances), 2836 (biological products), and 8731 (com-
mercial physical and biological research) (see also Guo et al., 2004;
Joos and Zhdanov, 2008).6
The pharmaceutical biotechnology industry is particularly useful for
studying the relationships between technological change and IOR
portfolios (Caner and Bruyaka, 2016). In terms of technological change,
it is a high-tech sector and therefore, by definition, subject to a great
amount of change. With regard to IORs, this industry is characterized
by a rapidly developing and widely dispersed network of scientific
leadership (Powell et al., 2005). Additionally, the skills and resources
needed to invent new medicines are broadly distributed. These two
factors combined have produced a situation in which firms find it ne-
cessary to collaborate extensively with one another (see also Deeds and
Hill, 1996). Indeed, Van de Vrande et al. (2009) have shown that all the
different modes of IORs are represented in this industry.
Moreover, the industry plays an important role in shaping the social
and economic environment. As such, the media reports frequently on
6 Although the initial selection of the 100 largest firms in any given year
might lead to a specific subset of large firms, the final 282 focal firms have a
relatively large standard deviation in terms of their firm size, indicating a more
diverse sample. Furthermore, smaller firms that had any IORs with these focal
firms are incorporated in the analyses. Moreover, focusing on the largest firms
has two advantages: first, it enables us to have a consistent set of firms over
time; and second, as opposed to small or privately held firms, large firms must
maintain and disclose their IORs and other relevant information. For this
reason, earlier IOR research has also focused on the largest firms (e.g., Ahuja,
2000a; Beckman et al., 2004; Hitt et al., 1996; Keil et al., 2008).
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developments in it and IORs among the firms. This in turn results in a
high availability of the recorded data needed to investigate our hy-
potheses. Finally, “biotechnology techniques have applications in a
number of subfields, including therapeutic pharmaceuticals, diagnostic
pharmaceuticals, agriculture, and chemicals. In this sense, the bio-
technology industry can be seen as an alternative to a multi-industry
study” (Folta, 1998 Equation can be dealt with Citation."/> , p. 1015).
The 282 largest focal firms from the Compustat North America
database were connected to other secondary databases. Information on
their IORs was gathered from multiple secondary data sources and
matched, including two Securities Data Corporation (SDC) platinum
databases from Thomson (i.e., the Alliances and Joint Ventures data-
base and the M&A database) and Thomson’s VentureXpert. Patent in-
formation, which was used to measure technological change, was ob-
tained from the USPTO and the NBER.
3.2. Measures
3.2.1. Dependent variables: IOR portfolio diversity and the number of
individual IOR modes
To operationalize the IORs of the focal firms, the 282 focal firms
from Compustat were matched to other databases through extensive
name standardization, name matching, and matching of other firm
identifiers (e.g., CUSIP, GVKEY). This matching was performed twice
(by two researchers independently) and a few minor differences were
resolved. CVC investments were pooled from Thomson’s VentureXpert,
which combines data from industry associations like the National
Venture Capital Association and the investment banking community.
VentureXpert has been used frequently in prior research (e.g.,
Dushnitsky and Lavie, 2010; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a; Dushnitsky
and Lenox (2005b); Mann and Sager, 2007; Ozmel et al., 2013; Van de
Vrande et al., 2009).
Data on the licensing agreements, non-equity alliances, minority
investments, JVs, and M&As of the 282 focal firms were pooled from
two well-known and frequently used Securities Data Corporation (SDC)
platinum databases from Thomson (used by e.g., Anand and Khanna,
2000; Bergh and Lim, 2008; Garcia Canal et al., 2008; Hagedoorn and
Cloodt, 2003; Phelps, 2010; Sahaym et al., 2007; Sampson, 2007;
Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Srivastava and Gnyawali, 2011). These
databases are among the most comprehensive sources of information on
IORs and are two of the only sources available for large-scale empirical
studies in this field (see Anand and Khanna, 2000).
The data stored in the SDC databases have been obtained from
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and those of their
international counterparts, trade publications, news sources and wires,
company annual reports, and other sources. Although the two SDC
databases are the most comprehensive and frequently used databases,
two limitations apply. First, SDC data is quite sparse up until 1990
(Anand and Khanna, 2000; Schilling, 2009). We therefore started our
analysis period in 1990. Second, a manual check of a subset of the SDC
data indicated that not all IORs could be double-checked and verified.
Therefore, all of the IORs for which the announcement date was esti-
mated, rather than known, were removed from the data, since these
may never have materialized (in line with e.g., Sampson, 2007).
Based on the two SDC databases and Thomson’s VentureXpert, the
number of individual IOR modes was created as the sum of each IOR
mode initiated, per focal firm, for a given year. IOR portfolio diversity
(i.e., the diversity of all the IORs of a focal firm) was operationalized
using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI, i.e., the sum of the
squared share of the number of IORs per IOR mode), also known as
Blau’s index of heterogeneity. This measure is a very commonly used
measure for diversity as variety (Harrison and Klein, 2007) and has
therefore been frequently used in previous studies (e.g., Duysters and
Lokshin, 2011; Van de Vrande, 2013). IOR portfolio diversity is oper-
ationalized as 1-HHI, since the HHI is a concentration measure, and we
prefer having the values that are near one correspond to high levels of
diversity, whereas values near zero should represent low levels. When a
focal firm, for example, has two non-equity alliances and two JVs, the
portfolio diversity would be: [1-(2/4)2+(2/4) 2]= 0.50. If a focal firm
has three non-equity alliances, two licensing agreements, and two JVs,
the IOR portfolio diversity would be: [1-(3/7)2+(2/7)2+
(2/7)2]= 0.65.
Independent Variable: Technological Change. Technological change
refers to change over time and was operationalized based on U.S. patent
information from the 282 focal firms. U.S. patents in the pharmaceu-
tical biotechnology industry can be regarded as a reliable source of
information, since this is an industry with strong patent protection,
making the propensity to patent high (Deeds and Hill, 1996). In line
with prior studies (e.g., Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005a; Dushnitsky and
Lenox (2005b); Hagedoorn and Cloodt, 2003; Ozmel et al., 2013), in-
formation from the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) was
used to complement the data from the 282 focal firms. Because the
USPTO grants patents to both the parent firm and to the firm’s sub-
sidiaries (Patel and Pavitt, 1997), the patent data needed to be con-
solidated at the parent firm level.
The NBER (2008) matching database between Compustat and the
USPTO was used to retrieve and consolidate the patents assigned to the
focal firms (Hall et al., 2001). Because the delay between the patent
application date and the patent grant date can be up to several years on
average, the NBER data up to and including 2006 were used. The ap-
plication date was used to assign the patents to the specific years, since
it most closely relates to the time of the technological change. The
NBER information also enabled the reallocation of patents over time,
reflecting M&As between the focal firms.
Year-to-year changes in the distribution of the patents across the
patent classifications were used to operationalize technological change
(based on e.g., Jaffe, 1968; Kang and Marhold, 2016; Sampson, 2007;
Van de Vrande et al., 2009)7. In the first step, a vector was generated for
each firm’s technological portfolio by measuring the distribution of its
patents across the patent classes, year by year. In a second step, the
similarities of these vectors in two subsequent years were measured by
the Pearson correlation coefficient ρ. Since similarity is the opposite of
change, technological change was then calculated as 1 - ρ, so that
higher values indicate higher levels of technological change. This op-
erationalization is in line with previous studies (e.g., Kang and
Marhold, 2016; Van de Vrande et al., 2009). In a recent comparison
across alternative operationalizations, Kang and Marhold (2016) fur-
thermore showed that there is a high degree of overlap between these
alternative operationalizations (e.g., Gilsing, Vanhaverbeke, and Pieters
(2014), who used the relative difference between the patents of the last
three years and the current year, and Goerzen (2007), who used the
percentage of change in the patents between two years).8
The technological change operationalization thus captures the
fluctuations of patenting behavior in the patent classes over time. If
there is limited fluctuation in the patenting behavior, technological
change is considered to be low. Industry technological change, which is
defined as the degree of change associated with technologies for a
group of firms in an industry, was measured based on patents for all 282
focal firms in a given year. Firm-specific technological change, which is
7 Both Jaffe (1986) and Sampson (2007) compare the diversity of the dis-
tribution of the patents over the patent classes between multiple firms, while in
this paper the focus is on comparing the diversity of the distribution of the
patents over the patent classes across time, both for all firms in the industry
combined (industry technological change), as well as for the individual firms
(firm-specific technological change).
8 The patent data distinguishes between three hierarchical levels of tech-
nology classes (similar to the two-digit, three-digit, or four-digit SIC codes). To
enable sufficient variation (not the case at the highest level) but prevent minor
changes in related technology classes (the case at the lowest level), the patent
subclass level (the middle level) is used (also referred to as the three-digit
level).
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defined as the degree of change associated with technologies used by
one specific firm, was measured in two steps. In the first step, the firm-
level change was calculated per individual focal firm in a given year
based on the patents in technology classes of each firm. In a second
step, the industry technological change was subtracted from the firm-
level change, to yield the firm-specific change. This operationalization
of firm-specific technological change captures the change at the firm
level and is relative to the industry technological change.
For a technological domain or industry, some patent classes are
more central and important than others (e.g., Kang and Marhold, 2016;
Van de Vrande et al., 2009). Previous studies have therefore in-
corporated this importance into their operationalizations of technolo-
gical change. Kang and Marhold (2016) and Van de Vrande et al.
(2009), for example, used the 80% most frequent patented technology
classes. To prevent the exclusion of less prominent technology classes
(i.e., the other 20%), our technological change operationalization ex-
tends these previous operationalizations by calculating a weight for
each patent class. This weight was calculated as the share of the total
number of patents in that patent class, based on all the focal firms, over
the total time period. For each year, this weight per patent class was
multiplied by the number of patents in that patent class.
Control Variables. To minimize alternative explanations, the analyses
also include a number of relevant control variables. First of all, we
control for the number of marketing alliances, as a proxy for specialized
complementary assets, by taking the sum of the number of marketing
alliances initiated in the five years (t-1 thru t-5) before the period of
analysis. The operationalization is inspired by Arora and Nandkumar
(2012), who measured complementary assets by the number of sales/
marketing executives. Second, we controlled for the stage of develop-
ment (in line with e.g., Ceccagnoli and Hicks, 2013), by taking the sum
of the number of citations to recent patents (i.e., the application year of
the cited patent falls within three years before the citing patent appli-
cation year). Third, the effectiveness of patent protection is controlled
for by taking the number of citations the focal firms’ patents have to sci-
entific knowledge (in line with e.g., Ceccagnoli and Hicks, 2013). The
patent citation data were obtained from the USPTO. Fourth, we con-
trolled for firm size, which can influence the focal firm’s propensity to
engage in IORs. Firm size was operationalized as the number of em-
ployees per year. Fifth, it is important to control for R&D intensity,
measured by the focal firm’s total R&D expenditure per year (this in-
formation was directly obtained from the Compustat database), because
it increases a focal firm’s capacity to recognize, value, and work with
external resources and knowledge through IORs.
Sixth, the focal firm’s past experience with each IOR mode can lead to
a build-up of specific capabilities and preferences per IOR mode. IOR
experience was therefore controlled for and operationalized as the sum
of the number of IORs initiated per mode in the five years before the
period of analysis. Seventh, since the pharmaceutical biotechnology
industry could be considered a multi-industry (Folta, 1998), and dif-
ferent industries have different propensities to patent, the focal firm’s
primary SIC industry dummy code is controlled for.9
3.3. Methods
To investigate the relationships between technological change (both
industry and firm-specific) and the diversity in the IOR portfolio, a
random effects OLS panel data estimation was used. To investigate the
relationships between technological change (both industry and firm-
specific) and the counts of the individual IOR modes, random effects
negative binomial panel data estimations were used. Random effects
estimation was chosen because it has a number of advantages over fixed
effects in our empirical context. First, it retains time-invariant variables
like the industry dummy control variables. Second, it includes the ob-
servations of firms that did not initiate a specific IOR mode (e.g., if a
firm did not initiate any non-equity alliance, it would be dropped from
the non-equity alliance analyses if fixed effects estimation were used;
fixed effects estimations would therefore result in different samples
being compared across the models). Third, random effects estimation
does not suffer from the incidental parameter problem that fixed effects
estimation has (i.e., the coefficients of dummy variables used in fixed
effects estimations are not consistent, since the number of these para-
meters increases as the number of observational units increases, and in
these analyses, there are 282 observational units). Fourth, random ef-
fects estimation allows for individual effects and thereby controls for
unobserved heterogeneity. A Hausman test (based on Model 7) ruled
out the need for fixed effects (p=0.453). To check for robustness, the
negative binomial models were also re-analyzed with Poisson estima-
tions. The results are presented in Table 4. The results show consistent
findings compared to the findings presented in Table 3.
4. Results
The descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations can be found in
Table 1. Industry technological change has a mean of 0.14, while the
mean of firm-specific technological change is 0.68. At -0.17, the cor-
relation between these two measures is low. The correlations between
the variables do not suggest that collinearity is an issue. The diversity of
modes in an IOR portfolio has a mean of 0.14, indicating relatively low
levels of IOR portfolio diversity. The number of separate IOR modes
used by the 282 focal firms is presented in Table 2. In total, the firms
initiated 8440 new IORs.
Table 3 presents the results of the analyses of the impact of both
industry and firm-specific technological change on the diversity of IOR
modes in a portfolio (Model 1) and the initiation of new individual IOR
modes (Models 2–7). Industry and firm-specific technological change
are simultaneously included in the analyses to control for their impact
on each other.
The results of Model 1 (Table 3) indicate a positive and significant
relationship between industry technological change and the diversity of
IOR modes in a portfolio (β= 0.09, p < 0.01), confirming Hypothesis
1. Models 2 and 3 show a positive and significant relationship between
industry technological change and both licensing agreements
(β=0.89, p < 0.001) and non-equity alliances (β=1.46,
p < 0.001). Model 4, however, reveals a significant negative re-
lationship between industry technological change and CVC investments
(β = -2.87, p < 0.001). Therefore, the first part of Hypothesis 2, which
argued that industry technological change would be positively related
to the focal firms’ newly initiated IORs with lower levels of inter-
dependence (i.e., licensing, non-equity alliances, and CVC investments),
is only partly confirmed.
Models 5 and 7 show a negative and significant relationship be-
tween industry technological change and both minority investments (β
= -1.06, p= 0.054) and M&As (β = -0.82, p < 0.01). Model 6,
however, reveals a non-significant relationship between industry tech-
nological change and JVs. Therefore, the second part of Hypothesis 2,
arguing for a negative relationship between industry technological
change and newly initiated IORs with higher levels of interdependence
(i.e., minority investments, JVs, and M&As), is also partly confirmed.
Overall, Hypothesis 2 is thus partly confirmed.
Model 1 of Table 3 also shows a significant negative relationship
between firm-specific technological change and the diversity of IOR
modes used in a portfolio (β = -0.03, p < 0.01), thereby confirming
Hypothesis 3. The first part of Hypothesis 4, which argued for a nega-
tive relationship between firm-specific technological change and the
focal firms’ initiation of new IORs with lower levels of inter-
dependence—licensing agreements (β = -0.17, p= 0.051), non-equity
9 Controlling for the years (through the incorporation of year dummies)
raised further issues due to the correlation between industry technological
change (per year) and the year dummy variables. These year dummy variables
were therefore excluded from the analyses.
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alliances (β = -0.19, p < 0.05), and CVC investments (β = -0.87,
p < 0.001)—is confirmed based on Models 2-4.
Models 5 and 6 reveal a significant negative relationship between
firm-specific technological change and both the initiation of new min-
ority investments (β = -0.75, p < 0.001) and JVs (β = -0.38,
p < 0.05), while Model 7 reveals a negative, but non-significant, re-
lationship with the initiation of new M&As (β = -0.13, n.s.). Combined,
these last three models show a negative relationship between firm-
specific technological change and the initiation of new IORs with re-
latively higher levels of interdependence, with the exception of M&As,
which conflicts with the second part of Hypothesis 4, in which we
argued for a positive effect. Overall, Hypothesis 4 is thus partly con-
firmed.
With regard to Hypothesis 5a and the impact on the diversity in the
IOR portfolio, Model 1 in Table 3 shows that the coefficient of industry
technological change (β=0.09, std. err.: 0.03) is larger than the
coefficient of firm-specific technological change (β = -0.03, std. err.:
0.01). Testing the differences between these coefficients reveals a sig-
nificant difference (p < 0.001), thereby confirming Hypothesis 5a.
With regard to Hypothesis 5b and the impact on the number of IOR
modes, Models 2 through 7 in Table 3 reveal larger coefficients of in-
dustry technological change for all IOR modes except CVC investments.
Testing the differences between these coefficients reveals a significant
difference for licensing agreements (p < 0.001), non-equity alliances
(p < 0.001), CVC investments (p < 0.001), JVs (p=0.07), and M&As
(p < 0.01). So, with the exception of minority investments, Hypothesis
5b is also confirmed.
In contrast to our predictions (second part of H4), increasing levels
of firm-specific technological change result in a decrease in almost all
IOR modes. To investigate this in more detail, an additional comparison
was made for the overall portfolio diversity, in addition to all the in-
dividual IOR modes, with regard to firms experiencing above and below
the mean levels of technological change (both industry as well as firm-
specific changes). To provide additional insight, the total number of
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
1. Industry Tech. Change 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.40
2. Firm-specific Tech. Change 0.68 0.49 −0.40 2.00
3. IOR Portfolio Mode Diversity 0.14 0.25 0.00 0.81
4. Licensing Agreements 0.52 1.26 0.00 11.00
5. Non-equity Alliances 0.61 1.41 0.00 11.00
6. CVC Investments 0.28 1.89 0.00 27.00
7. Minority Investments 0.11 0.46 0.00 6.00
8. Joint Ventures (JVs) 0.17 0.89 0.00 23.00
9. Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) 0.56 1.23 0.00 14.00
10. Marketing Alliances 0.16 0.53 0.00 4.00
11. Citing Recent Patents 0.56 2.32 0.00 61.00
12. Citing Scientific Sources 10.41 31.45 0.00 383.00
13. Firm Sizea 6.55 17.46 0.00 122.20
14. Firm R&D Intensityb 0.25 0.80 0.00 12.18
15. Licensing Experience 0.35 1.05 0.00 8.00
16. Non-equity Alliance Experience 0.09 0.41 0.00 4.00
17. CVC Investments Experience 0.27 1.49 0.00 19.00
18. Minority Investments Experience 0.10 0.43 0.00 5.00
19. JV Experience 0.17 0.50 0.00 3.00
20. M&A Experience 0.53 1.61 0.00 17.00
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations.
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. Industry Tech. Change 1
2. Firm-specific Tech. Change −0.17 1
3. IOR Portfolio Mode Diversity 0.05 −0.30 1
4. Licensing Agreements 0.07 −0.29 0.59 1
5. Non-equity Alliances 0.11 −0.30 0.60 0.57 1
6. CVC Investments −0.04 −0.11 0.20 0.15 0.19 1
7. Minority Investments −0.03 −0.18 0.46 0.40 0.37 0.20 1
8. Joint Ventures (JVs) 0.03 −0.15 0.37 0.37 0.41 0.04 0.37 1
9. Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) −0.05 −0.13 0.49 0.32 0.39 0.27 0.38 0.35 1
10. Marketing Alliances 0.04 −0.25 0.26 0.32 0.28 0.03 0.14 0.06 0.11 1
11. Citing Recent Patents −0.04 −0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 −0.01 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 1
12. Citing Scientific Sources −0.08 −0.43 0.40 0.42 0.36 0.12 0.27 0.25 0.20 0.38 0.04 1
13. Firm Sizea −0.02 −0.35 0.51 0.51 0.60 0.39 0.38 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.01 0.57 1
14. Firm R&D Intensityb −0.05 −0.28 0.42 0.38 0.45 0.37 0.28 0.14 0.36 0.34 0.00 0.46 0.84 1
15. Licensing Experience 0.05 −0.32 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.10 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.84 0.02 0.50 0.46 0.42 1
16. Non-equity Alliance Experience 0.03 −0.14 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.10 1
17. CVC Investments Experience 0.02 −0.21 0.28 0.30 0.33 0.42 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.29 0.03 0.39 0.46 0.31 0.35 0.00 1
18. Minority Investments Experience 0.04 −0.19 0.30 0.26 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.17 0.18 0.23 0.02 0.37 0.38 0.21 0.42 0.14 0.67 1
19. JV Experience 0.06 −0.30 0.32 0.33 0.39 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.48 0.02 0.46 0.48 0.38 0.65 0.06 0.52 0.55 1
20. M&A Experience 0.04 −0.28 0.37 0.36 0.42 0.20 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.51 0.01 0.49 0.51 0.39 0.62 0.14 0.48 0.56 0.53 1
a Divided by 103; b Divided by 106.
Table 2






Joint Ventures (JVs) 600
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) 2,260
Total 8,440
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IORs (i.e., the count of the number of IORs per year) and the number of
partners (i.e., the count of the unique number of partners in the port-
folio across all IOR modes) were also included in this comparison.
Table 5 shows the means and standard deviations for these vari-
ables. The first two columns present the overall sample, followed by the
values above and below the average industry technological change. The
last four columns show the values above and below the average firm-
specific technological change. The results confirm the results in Table 3
by showing that firms experiencing above-average firm-specific tech-
nological change have a lower IOR portfolio diversity and fewer in-
dividual IOR modes than firms experiencing below-average firm-spe-
cific technological change, as well as compared to the overall sample.
Also, the total number of IORs and the number of partners are lower in
these comparisons. This is in contrast to the means for firms experi-
encing below-average firm-specific technological change, which have a
higher portfolio diversity, more individual IOR modes, more IORs in
total, and more partners. The split sample analyses based on industry
technological change show smaller differences.
5. Discussion and conclusions
The literature on organizational adaptation suggests that firms need
to adapt to changing environmental conditions (e.g., Haveman, 2003;
Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1985; Meyer et al., 1990; O’Reilly and Tushman,
2008; Siggelkow and Levinthal, 2003). The implication for IORs is that
to secure future value creation and value capture from collaboration,
firms need to also adapt their external organization of collaborations
and partnerships (Ahuja et al., 2012; Phelps et al., 2012; Powell et al.,
2005; Kantola et al., 2017). This raises a question that has not been
considered until now, either in the literature on organizational adap-
tation or in the literature on interfirm relationships: how firms adapt
their external organization and address such change is important for
understanding how they accomplish the major strategic task of re-
sponding to environmental circumstances.
In this study, we considered the role of technological change as an
antecedent of adaptations to IORs. To address this issue, we dis-
tinguished between two types of technological change, namely industry
and firm-specific. The key questions we considered were: to what extent
do firms respond differently to each of these forms of change; and do
they do it by exerting more control or becoming more adaptive? To
study this, we considered both what type of responses firms exhibit,
through either an increase or decrease in their IOR portfolio diversity
(portfolio level), and also how, specifically, they put these adaptations
into action (mode level).
Following on our theoretical framework and empirical findings, a
number of results stand out. First, regarding industry level change, we
Table 3
Industry and Firm-specific Technological Change and IORs.
Random Effects
negative binomial











New JVs New M&As
Industry Tech. Change 0.09** 0.89*** 1.46*** −2.87*** −1.06† 0.47 −0.82**
(0.03) (0.26) (0.23) (0.61) (0.55) (0.48) (0.26)
Firm-specific Tech. Change −0.03** −0.17† −0.19* −0.87*** −0.75*** −0.38* −0.13
(0.01) (0.09) (0.08) (0.23) (0.19) (0.17) (0.08)
Marketing Alliances 0.02 −0.03 0.00 0.03 0.40 −0.30 0.10
(0.03) (0.24) (0.24) (0.50) (0.32) (0.44) (0.29)
Citing Recent Patents 0.00 0.01 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Citing Scientific Sources 0.00** 0.00 −0.00** −0.01*** 0.00 0.00*** −0.00†
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.00*** 0.01* 0.02*** 0.02** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.02***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Firm R&D Intensity −0.00 −0.14* −0.19*** 0.18** −0.19* −0.66*** 0.00
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) (0.04)
Licensing Exp. 0.00 0.18 0.19 0.67† −0.16 0.37 −0.11
(0.02) (0.15) (0.15) (0.36) (0.19) (0.25) (0.17)
Non-equity Alliance Exp. 0.02 0.35* 0.37* −0.10 0.14 −0.08 −0.04
(0.02) (0.18) (0.16) (0.21) (0.20) (0.30) (0.17)
CVC Investments Exp. −0.01 0.07 0.02 0.21* −0.10 0.07 −0.02
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08)
Minority Investments Exp. 0.05t −0.16 0.03 −0.27 0.62* 0.14 0.20
(0.03) (0.24) (0.24) (0.38) (0.27) (0.43) (0.27)
JV Exp. 0.01 0.02 0.30† −1.06* −0.02 0.22 0.19
(0.02) (0.19) (0.18) (0.45) (0.24) (0.27) (0.17)
M&A Exp. 0.01† 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 −0.05 0.09
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
SIC 2833 0.00 1.75** −0.46 1.65 −23.82 0.31 0.32
(0.04) (0.66) (0.53) (1.69) (5.36) (0.84) (0.46)
SIC 2834 0.03 2.12*** 0.42 −0.67 0.12 1.04* −0.14
(0.02) (0.47) (0.27) (0.91) (0.41) (0.50) (0.24)
SIC 2835 0.00 2.01*** 0.15 −2.79* −0.23 0.19 −0.10
(0.03) (0.50) (0.30) (1.10) (0.47) (0.57) (0.28)
SIC 2836 0.04 2.35*** 0.49† 0.14 0.01 0.17 −0.22
(0.03) (0.49) (0.29) (0.89) (0.44) (0.56) (0.27)
Constant 0.07** −2.16*** −0.28 −0.12 −0.85† −1.49** 0.66*
(0.02) (0.48) (0.29) (0.88) (0.49) (0.54) (0.26)
Observations 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994
Number of firms 278 278 278 278 278 278 278
Sigma_u 0.0859 . . . . . .
Sigma_e 0.186 . . . . . .
Rho 0.176 . . . . . .
Log-likelihood a . −2274 −2490 −658.5 −817.5 −992.2 −2536
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found strong empirical evidence for Hypothesis 1, which specifies a
positive relationship between industry technological change and IOR
portfolio diversity (at the portfolio level). Second, at the mode level, we
found both a confirmation as well as a rejection of Hypothesis 2, which
specifies how firms put adaptations to their IOR portfolio diversity into
action. We found confirmation in so far as licensing and non-equity
alliances were concerned. This is in line with our argument that when
faced with a looming loss emanating from industry technological
change, firms will engage in more market-like, flexible forms of colla-
boration. We also found some confirmation for our prediction of a ne-
gative relationship between the degree of industry technological change
and the number of newly initiated IORs with higher levels of inter-
dependence. Meanwhile, while we found the predicted negative effect
for M&As and minority investments, the effect for JVs was non-
Table 4
Industry and Firm-specific Technological Change and IORs.











New JVs New M&As
Industry Tech. Change 0.09** 1.04*** 1.53*** −2.96*** −1.21* 0.60 −1.04***
(0.03) (0.20) (0.19) (0.33) (0.48) (0.37) (0.21)
Firm-specific Tech. Change −0.03** −0.51*** −0.47*** −0.91*** −0.78*** −0.62*** −0.06
(0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10) (0.15) (0.12) (0.06)
Marketing Alliances 0.02 0.34*** 0.19** −1.45*** 0.22 −0.15 −0.00
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) (0.17) (0.13) (0.08)
Citing Recent Patents 0.00 0.02** 0.02** −0.11** −0.02 0.03* 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01)
Citing Scientific Sources 0.00** 0.00*** −0.00 −0.00*** 0.00 0.00*** −0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm Size 0.00*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Firm R&D Intensity −0.00 −0.20*** −0.14*** 0.21*** −0.18** −0.68*** −0.13***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03)
Licensing Exp. 0.00 −0.08* −0.08* 0.38*** −0.04 −0.09 −0.05
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.05)
Non-equity Alliance Exp. 0.02 0.07† 0.09* −0.17*** −0.10 −0.28** 0.10*
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.04)
CVC Investments Exp. −0.01 −0.02* −0.06*** 0.26*** −0.07* −0.12*** −0.06***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
Minority Investments Exp. 0.05† 0.01 0.11* 0.51*** 0.72*** 0.11 0.13†
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.13) (0.11) (0.07)
JV Exp. 0.01 0.10† 0.19*** −1.88*** −0.57*** 0.08 0.03
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.16) (0.15) (0.11) (0.06)
M&A Exp. 0.01† 0.01 0.05*** 0.23*** 0.01 0.13*** 0.09***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01)
SIC 2833 0.00 1.53*** −0.51 0.06 −15.32 0.75 −0.39*
(0.04) (0.45) (0.35) (0.68) (9.06) (0.54) (0.18)
SIC 2834 0.03 2.15*** 0.48** 0.80* 0.36 1.11** −0.58***
(0.02) (0.36) (0.15) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36) (0.09)
SIC 2835 0.00 1.87*** 0.23 −0.04 −0.00 0.20 −0.72***
(0.03) (0.36) (0.17) (0.43) (0.40) (0.41) (0.11)
SIC 2836 0.04 2.21*** 0.49** 1.62*** 0.52 0.48 −0.64***
(0.03) (0.36) (0.16) (0.37) (0.37) (0.39) (0.10)
Constant 0.07** −3.08*** −1.42*** −2.33*** −2.50*** −2.98*** −0.24*
(0.02) (0.36) (0.16) (0.37) (0.36) (0.37) (0.10)
Observations 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994 2,994
Number of firms 278 278 278 278 278 278 278
Sigma_u 0.0859 . . . . . .
Sigma_e 0.186 . . . . . .
Rho 0.176 . . . . . .
Log likelihood a . −2651 −2821 −1597 −886.5 −1235 −2981
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.001, * p < 0.05, † p < 0.10.
a Models 2–7 were run as separate models for the different IOR modes. Therefore, no comparison can be made between the log likelihoods.
Table 5











Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
IOR Portfolio Mode Diversity 0.14 0.25 0.16 0.26 0.13 0.24 0.09 0.20 0.22 0.29
Licensing Agreements 0.52 1.26 0.61 1.38 0.45 1.15 0.27 0.76 0.90 1.71
Non-equity Alliances 0.61 1.41 0.77 1.62 0.48 1.19 0.32 0.90 1.06 1.86
CVC Investments 0.28 1.89 0.20 1.49 0.33 2.15 0.13 1.28 0.50 2.54
Minority Investments 0.11 0.46 0.09 0.38 0.12 0.51 0.05 0.32 0.19 0.60
Joint Ventures (JVs) 0.17 0.89 0.22 1.09 0.13 0.68 0.07 0.41 0.33 1.30
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&As) 0.56 1.23 0.49 1.10 0.62 1.32 0.46 1.10 0.71 1.38
Number of IORs 2.24 4.67 2.38 4.68 2.13 4.66 1.30 2.86 3.69 6.26
Number of Partners 1.68 3.46 1.87 3.86 1.53 3.09 1.02 1.83 2.70 4.85
T. de Leeuw, et al. Research Policy 48 (2019) 1586–1600
1596
significant.
This is also consistent with a number of other studies such as those
by Santoro and McGill (2005), who found that technological un-
certainty decreased the likelihood of hierarchical governance; Cuypers
and Martin (2010), who found that economic, local institutional and
exchange rate uncertainty led to a smaller share of ownership in foreign
JVs; and Li and Li (2010), who found that market uncertainty was
positively related to the use of flexible ownership strategies in min-
ority/majority JVs. Also, Folta (1998) found that technological un-
certainty was positively related to equity-based collaborations versus
acquisitions.
However, in contrast to these studies, as well as to our own
Hypothesis 2, a negative relationship was found between industry
technological change and CVC investments, considered a flexible mode
based on its level of interdependence, whereas a positive effect had
been predicted. This negative effect stands in sharp contrast with the
positive effect for licensing and non-equity alliances, as the other two
flexible modes of IORs. Our interpretation of this unexpected finding is
as follows. Our study differs from earlier studies in its focus on the
portfolio level, which is revealing because it shows how firms choose to
adapt through a very rigorous adjustment of their entire IOR portfolio.
The strong emphasis on the addition of the two most flexible forms of
collaboration, at the expense of control-oriented forms and even also of
CVCs, suggests that firms adapt to industry technological change
through a major overhaul of their IOR portfolio. Although this still fits
with the underlying logic of our predictions (cf. Hypotheses 1 and 2),
this is an even stronger and more directed response than we antici-
pated. In fact, this appears to be a major adaptation process of portfolio
churning, in which firms relinquish control at the level of individual
partners but gain control at the portfolio level by creating the possibi-
lity for keeping future options open and, in this way, become more
adaptive to changing environmental conditions.
Regarding firm-specific change, we found strong empirical evidence
for Hypothesis 3, which specifies a negative relationship with IOR
portfolio diversity. At the mode level, we found both a confirmation as
well as a rejection of Hypothesis 4, which specifies how firms put
changes to their IOR portfolio diversity into action. We found con-
firmation for the first part of Hypothesis 4, predicting a negative re-
lationship between firm-specific technological change and a focal firm’s
initiation of new IORs with low levels of interdependence, comprised of
CVC investments, non-equity alliances, and licensing. In contrast to the
second part of Hypothesis 4, however, a significant negative effect was
found for both minority investments and JVs, whereas a negative non-
significant effect was found for M&As. This runs counter to our pre-
diction.
Because of our focus on the entire portfolio level and the additional
comparison in Table 5, we can observe that firms decreased the in-
itiation of new IORs across all modes except for M&As. This implies that
firms respond to firm-specific change by cutting back on five out of six
IOR modes, including both flexible and more hierarchical modes. Ear-
lier, we argued that the prospect of gain leads to fewer boundary-
spanning and more control-oriented forms of collaboration (i.e., more
hierarchical). What we had not predicted though, which is what these
findings show, was that firms make the more fundamental decision to
adapt by decreasing their collaboration activities across most of their
IOR modes, flexible as well as hierarchical forms. This suggests that
firms prefer to gain control through less emphasis on external colla-
boration overall, indicating that they favor a stronger in-house or-
ientation in view of appropriating the expected gain.
Furthermore, an additional explanation for why focal firms’ in-
tensify their in-house orientation may be found by taking the perspec-
tive of potential partners into account. Following Ahuja (2000b), the
likelihood of collaboration with a focal firm depends on not only its
own inducements to collaborate, but also its attractiveness as a partner
and the value of the resources it has to offer potential partners; that is,
“it takes two to tango.” However, when a focal firm starts taking a
different direction than the rest of the industry, it becomes more dif-
ficult for potential partners to govern the collaboration and assess the
value of that firm’s resources. As a consequence, a focal firm becomes
less attractive for potential partners, to the extent that its firm-specific
uncertainty goes up. That means it will become more difficult for it to
find potential partners. This may accordingly amplify that firm’s in-
house orientation, producing a stronger decrease in its collaboration
activities overall than we anticipated.10
Finally, we found confirmation for both Hypotheses 5a and 5b. At
the portfolio level, we found that the effect size of a firm’s adaptation to
its IOR portfolio diversity was indeed substantively stronger for its in-
crease in response to industry technological change, compared to its
decrease in response to firm-specific technological change. In a similar
vein, we found that the effect sizes of changes in its individual IOR
modes were stronger for industry technological change than for firm-
specific change. This confirms the general idea in prospect theory that
the “fear of loss,” represented in this study by industry technological
change, generally proves more powerful than the “hope of gain,” re-
presented by firm-specific technological change.
From these findings, a number of conclusions follow. Our dual focus
on the portfolio level and the mode level has enabled us to develop a
more comprehensive understanding of how firms accomplish the major
strategic task of adapting their IORs to environmental change. This dual
focus allowed us to identify that firms respond to the two types of
technological change in somewhat unexpected ways, that is, through
stronger forms of adaptation than anticipated. Firms attempt to gain
control over industry technological change by churning their portfolio
of IORs, leading to loosening control at the mode level and greater
adaptivity at the portfolio level. With firm-specific change, they adapt
instead by reducing portfolio diversity, while cutting back on colla-
boration across five out of six modes. These are new insights that
complement the literature, with its dominant focus on dyadic colla-
boration with an individual partner, in that they offer a more in-depth
understanding of how firms strategically adapt: either through an in-
crease of their boundary-spanning activities and a major overhaul of
their portfolio in response to industry technological change or by
moving away from collaboration overall and resorting to more internal
actions in response to firm-specific change.
The question we examined in this paper on how firms adapt their
external organization, as consisting of IORs, goes beyond the well-stu-
died question of how to economize on transaction costs in view of
mitigating the hazards of a specific partnership and whether, for ex-
ample, a more hierarchical or more flexible form of collaboration is
preferred. While the underlying issue pertains to an important tactical
choice as such, that dominant perspective has typically overlooked the
more strategic decision of whether to increase collaboration activities
overall or decrease them and rely on a more in-house orientation in-
stead. Our findings complement the earlier study by Beckman et al.
(2004); it focused on the question of deepening versus broadening of
firm networks but failed to consider the more fundamental question of
whether this occurred through more or less external collaboration in
the first place. Adaptation of an IOR portfolio goes beyond substituting
one mode of IOR for another and is thus less about the tactical decisions
regarding specific modes that has been the dominant focus in the lit-
erature and more about the strategic decisions about intensifying or
diminishing collaboration activities overall and initiating highly flex-
ible modes or relying on an in-house orientation.
In addressing the question of how firms adjust their IOR portfolio to
technological change, we contribute to different bodies of literature.
First, we contribute to the literature on organizational adaptation. In
this literature, the major emphasis has been on firm-internal issues,
such as, among other things, adjustments of standing managerial roles
(Stan and Puranam, 2017), individual learning (Aggarwal et al., 2017),
10 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
T. de Leeuw, et al. Research Policy 48 (2019) 1586–1600
1597
service offerings (Ruef, 1997), current strategy and structure (Jennings
and Seaman, 1994), or internal routines (Yi et al., 2016), with no at-
tention to the external organization of IORs. Given the fact that colla-
boration has become a widespread practice, in all its different forms,
and is of eminent importance to firm performance and long-term sur-
vival, this is a critical topic to understand. In line with our expectations,
we found that firms adapt their portfolio diversity by increasing or
decreasing it. However, unexpected was the new finding that, apart
from how they organize this in a portfolio of different IOR modes, firms
also adapt more fundamentally by either increasing or decreasing the
extent to which they rely on collaboration. Thus, we found that adap-
tation can also mean a de-emphasis on IORs, with a stronger internal
focus instead. This suggests that the boundary between a firm’s internal
and external organization is permeable when it comes to adaptation of
its IOR portfolio, a finding that also complements, for example, insights
into how firms’ CEOs respond internally to technological change
(Eggers and Kaplan, 2009).
Second, we contribute to the literature on interfirm collaboration
and IOR portfolios. This literature has shown that an IOR portfolio for
innovation holds the promise of delivering value and enhancing per-
formance. However, our current understanding of such portfolios and
the associated performance outcomes will remain only partial, at best,
without an appreciation of the adaptations in the portfolios that gave
rise to such outcomes in the first place (Ahuja et al., 2012; Kantola
et al., 2017; Tatarinowitz et al., 2016). By developing a more beha-
vioral understanding of the antecedents of changes to IOR portfolios,
our study argues and shows that these structures are only temporary
and subject to change. This carries implications for standing insights in
the IOR literature, such as on social capital. The common message from
this literature is that collaboration portfolios and interfirm networks
convey stable social capital, which offers social benefits (Coleman,
1988), as well as private benefits (Burt, 1992). Following our findings,
which show that companies adapt more firmly and more directed than
anticipated, the well-studied private and social benefits of social capital
obtained from a collaboration portfolio may be more temporary and
more liable to decay than is currently assumed by the dominant, static
view in the literature on IORs, which has mainly emphasized the stable
value flowing from these activities (e.g., Adler and Kwon, 2002; Gilsing
et al., 2008; Tasselli et al., 2015; Wassmer, 2010).
Third, our study contributes by developing a micro-foundational
understanding, based on prospect theory, of the antecedents of IOR
portfolios and network change. In this way, we address an important
void between two long-standing traditions of research, namely between
networks and IORs on the one hand and behavioral theories of the firm
on the other hand (Baum et al., 2005; Gavetti et al., 2012). Combining
these streams of literature offers new insights to the mainstream,
structural view in the network literature that has mainly emphasized
the prerogative of network structure and assumed its stability but has
largely ignored whether and how firms change their IOR portfolios and
networks (Ahuja et al., 2012; Phelps et al., 2012; Tatarinowitz et al.,
2016).
Here, our study contributes by shedding more light on the in-
adequately studied role of agency in IORs and networks, which refers to
a firm’s purposeful enactment of their IORs through creating beneficial
links or dissolving unattractive or ineffective ones (Burt, 2005;
Emirbayer and Mische, 1998; White, 1992). Relying on such an agency
perspective is particularly useful when developing and testing theories
that explain how IORs and network strategies become manifest in a
dynamic context (Ahuja et al., 2012), which is the case in our dynamic,
technology-based setting. Here, our study sheds more light on this by
showing how firms purposefully enact the adaptation of their IOR
portfolio and how this differs as a function of different types of tech-
nological change. This serves as an important complement to the
dominant view in the literature that has mainly emphasized the per-
formance outcomes of stable network traits, either in dyadic form (e.g.,
Gulati, 1995), portfolio form (e.g., Srivastava and Gnyawali, 2011), or
network form (e.g., Gilsing et al., 2008) but has ignored how such
structures come into being, and get adapted, in the first place. Our
study addresses this issue, as it develops a more comprehensive, be-
havioral understanding of the origins of a firm’s portfolio of IORs before
it gives rise to the (well-established) performance outcomes.
Notwithstanding these contributions, this study is limited by its
focus on large firms (although there is quite some variation in the
sample with regard to firm size). Since large firms might be better able
to initiate and maintain IORs, they might also be better able to adjust
their IOR portfolio. As a consequence, the effects for smaller firms
might be different. Future studies could aim to extend our findings by
investigating how small firms adjust their IOR portfolio. In addition, the
focus of this study is on the initiation of new IOR modes and the overall
distribution of these modes in the IOR portfolio and assumes (as in
other studies) that existing IORs discontinue after some time. Although
it is difficult to obtain sufficient data on IOR discontinuations, further
research is needed to understand the ways and extent to which firms
actively discontinue their IOR modes in response to a changing en-
vironment.
Another interesting avenue for future research is to study what firm-
internal adaptations are needed to support these external adaptations to
changing environmental conditions. For example, if a firm decides to
churn its IOR portfolio in response to industry technological change,
what adaptations are needed to any of its internal attributes, such as to
structure, managerial roles, or identity, to support this change? These
topics have been studied in the realm of organizational adaptation but
have remained limited to a firm-internal focus (e.g., Dutton and
Dukerich, 1991; Jennings and Seaman, 1994; Stan and Puranam, 2017).
An understanding of the interplay between adaptation of external and
internal attributes, both in its process and performance effects, would
provide a more comprehensive understanding of organizational adap-
tation.
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